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Networks protected by firewalls and physical separation schemes are threatened 
by multi-homed devices. The purpose of this study is to detect multi-homed devices on a 
computer network. More specifically, the goal is to evaluate passive detection of multi-
homed devices running various operating systems while communicating on a network. 
TCP timestamp data was used to estimate clock skews using linear regression and linear 
optimization methods. Analysis revealed that detection depends on the consistency of the 
estimated clock skew. Through vertical testing, it was also shown that clock skew 
consistency depends on the installed operating system. The linear programming and 
linear regression methods agree with one another when clock skews are consistent, 
indicating that linear regression is sufficient to identify multi-homed hosts in networks 
with low network delay. Further analysis showed inconsistencies of clock skew 
estimation on newer versions of OS X and freeBSD 12.0; the clock skews from these 
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As industry shifts from traditional network infrastructure toward software-defined 
networks (SDN), network security continues to be a primary concern for network 
managers at all levels. Likewise, as customer demand for services from networks rises, it 
is increasingly difficult to manage policies, handle dynamic internet loads, and respond 
quickly to faults and changes [1]. SDN is a new paradigm that changes the way networks 
are designed, managed, and secured [2]; such networks have the potential to increase 
network performance and security while reducing costs [3]. SDNs completely change the 
way in which network managers think about their network and security within the 
network.  
A. MOTIVATION 
Similar to the commercial sector, the United States military recognizes the 
benefits of implementing SDN and is actively exploring the best methods to use SDN on 
its networks. Any new technology involves many unknowns, so the military must explore 
all possible security threats in SDNs prior to wide-scale adoption.  
Many concerns surround network security, and the segregation of classified 
networks is one area affecting U.S. military network operations. The Committee on the 
National Security System Advisory Memorandum requires that all unclassified networks 
be physically separated from classified networks by at least three meters [4]. This 
distance ensures that there is no path for data from the classified network to interfere with 
the unclassified network.  
The physical barrier between a classified and unclassified network can be 
bypassed by a multi-homed device having multiple network connections: originating at 
the multi-homed device and terminating at the segregated networks. Multi-homing a 
device can also be used to bypass a firewall in a similar way. Therefore, a method to 
detect when a device is multi-homed needs to be developed. Preventing circumvention of 
firewalls and physical network segregation is essential to network separation security.  
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B. OBJECTIVE 
A plethora of operating systems support multi-homed connections, which can be 
installed on virtually any modern computer. A hostile user can connect a multi-homed 
device to a network to bypass firewalls or physically isolated security schemes. The 
bypassing of security protocols presents a real threat to any sensitive network, so Martin 
[5] originally proposed a scheme to detect multi-homed devices on a network by 
determining and comparing clock skews of all devices connected to the network.  
Martin [5] determined the clock skews by passively collecting Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) timestamp data, which has been shown to reliably reveal the 
clock skew of a Network Interface Card (NIC) [5], [6]. The ability to calculate clock 
skews in [5] was limited to Raspberry Pis with Raspbian as the installed operating 
system. Because of the limitations of Raspberry Pis, it remains to be demonstrated that 
the detection methods Martin employed can be expanded to other devices and operating 
systems capable of connecting to a computer network and potentially an SDN.  
The objective of this thesis is to validate the detection method used in [5] when 
applied to a larger set of devices and operating systems. Specifically, to validate the 
multi-homed detection methods, we will determine whether a fingerprinter can passively 
collect TCP timestamp information and, in doing so, detect multi-homed devices with 
various operating systems installed while communicating on a computer network. The 
detection of multi-homed devices will assist in thwarting security threats to firewalls and 
physical separation schemes, ultimately making commercial- and military-grade 
networks more secure.  
C. RELATED WORK 
In their research, Khono et al. [6] introduced the idea of using the estimated clock 
skew of a host to identify a physical device on a network. They fingerprinted a given host 
CPU by exploiting microscopic deviations created during the manufacturing process. By 
using these deviations, they extrapolated a unique clock skew for each host. To determine 
the estimated clock skew of a CPU, they used the TCP timestamp option introduced in 
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RFC 1323 by determining timestamp offsets and then taking the first derivative of the 
offsets. They then compared the resulting clock skews with one another to show that they 
were unique and that the same device consistently produced the same clock skew [6].  
Polcak [7] further explored clock skew identification and successfully 
demonstrating that various operating systems could be fingerprinted by TCP and Internet 
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) data. They also showed that the majority of clock 
skews fall between -50 to 100 parts per million (ppm), reducing the ability to fingerprint 
networks with a large number of hosts due to the increased number of false positives [7]. 
Finally, they showed that the estimated clock skew did not change with network time 
protocol (NTP) updates [7].  
Martin [5] demonstrated that multi-homed devices could be detected using a 
fingerprinter by comparing the estimated clock skews of Raspberry Pis. With a large set 
of clock skews from multiple trials, Martin showed that the clock skews approached a 
Gaussian distribution, from which a confidence interval could be determined. To detect 
the presence of a multi-homed device, Martin compared a given clock skew to the 
confidence interval; if the clock skew fell between the upper and lower bounds of the 
calculated confidence interval, then it represents a 95% certainty that the two hosts 
originated from the same device. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses how 
SDNs are organized and the security threat posed by multi-homed devices. The 
discussion then shifts to how operating systems generate TCP timestamp information, as 
well as how the clock skew is generated from the TCP timestamp. The proposed scheme 
to detect multi-homed devices is then discussed in Chapter III, and the results from the 
SDN dual-homed test bed are reported in Chapter IV. Triple-homed test bed results are 
presented in Chapter V. Significant findings from the results, along with potential future 
work are discussed in Chapter VI. Appendix A and B contain the MATLAB code used to 
calculate the estimated clock skews and the confidence intervals, respectively.  
 4 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DOD) goes to great lengths to segregate networks 
based on the classification of information on the network, as required by [4]. The  DOD 
has determined that a physical separation scheme is the only acceptable method to ensure 
that data cannot cross between classified and unclassified networks. The ability of a user 
to circumvent such security measures by using a multi-homed device and connecting it to 
multiple networks concerns for network administrators and represents a prime 
opportunity by the hacking community [8]. The related goal of this thesis is to determine 
methods to mitigate multi-homed threats that may potentially be implemented on an 
SDN. This chapter focuses on relevant background information that will set up the 
detection scheme outlined in Chapter III. This chapter first discusses SDNs, then explains 
how a multi-homed host can bypass security measures. The discussion continues with 
TCP timestamps and how they are generated. The chapter concludes with an explanation 
of how a clock skew is determined and a discussion of confidence intervals.  
A. SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS 
Although legacy internet protocol (IP) networks have been adopted worldwide, 
they are complex, difficult to manage, and expensive to establish [9]. SDNs have the 
potential to alleviate many of the difficulties and high costs of traditional IP networks by 
separating the control logic (the control plane) from the physical traffic (the data plane) 
[1], [7], [10], [11]. With the implementation of SDNs, proprietary routing protocols 
previously implemented in hardware can now be implemented in software. This 
separation allows for complex switches and routers used in legacy networks to be 
downgraded to cost-effective simple switches and routers that receive routing flow rules 
from a centralized controlling device [7].  
SDNs also introduce an application plane, which consists of services provided by 
the network operator and perform tasks as specified [10]. A simple representation of the 
SDN planes is shown in Figure 1. Here, the application plane installs programs and 
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services onto the control plane via the northbound application programming interface 
(API). The control plane monitors traffic on the data plane and pushes flow rules from the 
control plane to the data plane via the southbound API [10]. Together, the northbound 
and southbound API control all services and flow rules within the SDN. Although not 
shown in Figure 1, this simplified network can be expanded by connecting multiple data 
planes to a single control plane or multiple control planes to multiple data planes, such 
that each data plane will have a dedicated southbound API to its assigned controller to 







Figure 1.  Functional Planes in a Software-Defined Network. 
Adapted from [10]. 
B. MULTI-HOMED HOSTS 
A multi-homed host is a device that establishes multiple connections to a single 
network or to multiple networks by using multiple NICs. Each NIC will have a unique 
MAC address and IP address assigned. Generally, multi-connection hosts create 
redundancy in a network by connecting the host to separate network nodes [8]. For 
example, to increase network reliability, a multi-homed host will have multiple 
connections to the Internet service providers (ISP). In this example, if one of the nodes 
becomes unavailable, the host will recognize the break in the connection and stop 
transmitting via the affected NIC. The host will then direct all future traffic to the NIC 
with the viable connection. This redundancy produced by multi-homed connections 
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ensures that single point node failures do not prevent communication within the network 
[5], [12]. 
A multi-homed connection has the potential to become a security threat to a 
protected network if it is connected to two networks, one of which is separated by a 
firewall or physical air gap. Protecting a network is vitally important to many commercial 
industries and the DOD. Denying or limiting access to a network is normally 
accomplished by either employing a firewall or physically separating a network from 
other networks. In this instance, the multi-homed connection serves as a bridge between 
the two networks, and a hostile actor can take advantage of this situation by bypassing the 
security measures to gain access to the denied network. In Figure 2, we show how the 
physically separated network can be bridged by a multi-homed device and remove the 
physical separation of the two networks. 




















Figure 2.  Physically Separated Networks Where a Multi-Homed Device 
Bypasses Security Measures 
C. TCP TIMESTAMPS 
The TCP timestamp option was introduced in RFC 1323 to meet the high 
throughput demand of high-speed fiber optics. RFC 1323 was implemented to protect 
against wrapped sequence (PAWS) numbers and to improve round trip time 
measurements (RTTM) [13]. RTTM is the time interval between sending a TCP package 
and receiving an acknowledgement from the destination; it is essential in the calculation 
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of the retransmission timeout (RTO) used in TCP [13]. Because of the high speeds and 
large bandwidth capabilities of fiber optic connections, TCP needed protection against 
receiving duplicate sequence numbers from the same device. PAWS used TCP timestamp 
data to identify instances in which duplicate sequence numbers are detected [13]. The 
timestamp option is 10 bytes long, as shown in Figure 3. 
Kind=8 10 TS Value (TSval) TS Echo Reply (TSecr)
1 1 4 4  
Figure 3.  TCP Timestamp Option Field. Source: [13]. 
The timestamp value (TSval) field is 4 bytes long and is obtained from an internal 
clock, referred to as the “timestamp clock.” According to RFC 1323, the time values 
must be proportional to real time. The timestamp echo reply (TSecr) is valid only if the 
ACK bit is set in the TCP header. When the bit is set, it will echo the timestamp value of 
the remote TCP connection [13]. 
According to RFC 1323, to generate TCP timestamps, the installed operating 
system employs either a virtual clock or a hardware clock. RFC 1323 only requires that 
the time TSval values are approximately proportional to real time to allow for RTTM. 
For example, within the Linux Kernel, the function SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK is 
called when a TCP timestamp is requested by the user or an application [14]. Upon 
verification of send buffer acknowledgement, the function reports the hardware time via a 
recvmsg() [14]. According to kernel.org [14], the recvmsg() is a control message struct 
and is passed to the TCP timestamp option field. These timestamps are essential in the 
clock skew calculations used for multi-homed detection.  
D. CLOCK SKEW  
All network devices have an internal clock, made up of hardware and software 
components that synchronize operations within the device [15]. This internal clock uses a 
crystal oscillator, which oscillates at a design-specified resolution and precision. The 
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resolution is the smallest interval in which time can be incremented and precision is how 
close the measurement is to the real measurement. In computer clocks, precision is 
determined automatically and is expressed as a power of two [16]. Because of 
microscopic deviations resulting from the manufacturing process, each oscillator in a 
CPU will tick with miniscule differences [6], [15], [17]. These differences in the tick of 
the clock can be collected remotely to calculate a clock skew by first using the 
timestamps of the target clock and then measuring the offset of a local clock [3], [15], 
[17]. 
The use of clock skews to identify network devices by passively monitoring 
timestamps was first introduced by Kohno et al. [6]. To calculate the estimated clock 
skew for a target, we use the notation of a time reported by a clock C  at a given time t  
as ( )CR t . For the remainder of this analysis, clock C will be referred to as the 
fingerprinter and clock D as the fingerprintee. The time offset between clock C  and 
clock D  is  
 , ( ) ( ) ( )C D C DO t R t R t  .  (1) 
Assuming that , ( )C DO t  is a differentiable function of t , then the clock skew for a given 
host is [7] 
 , ,( ) ( )C D C D
d
S t O t
dt
 . (2) 
Due to the fact that the fingerprintee clock ( )DR t  is not directly observable by the 
fingerprinter, we must use an indirect approach to determine the fingerprintee clock. The 
observed TCP timestamp packets from the fingerprintee are represented as offset points 
1 2( ( ), ( ))t t   where 1( )t  is the observation time of the fingerprinter and 2 ( )t  is the 
timestamp value sent by the fingerprintee. Using 2 ( )t , the fingerprintee clock ( )DR t can 
now be determined as 
 2( ) ( ) ( )DR t t t    (3) 
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where ( )t  is the network delay to transmit a packet from the fingerprintee to the 
fingerprinter [7]. Substituting (3) into (1), we get 
 
, 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )C D C tt R tO t    .  (4) 
We can now calculate 
, ( )C DS t  as we have all of the values in (4). The estimated 
clock skew and the actual clock skew for a device are parallel lines that have the same 
angle   and shifted in the vertical direction by a constant  as shown in Figure 4 [7]. 
The red hashed line is the true clock skew of the target host and the solid green line is the 
upper bound solution of the estimated clock skew. The constant  is a direct result from 




 in (4) [7].  
 
Figure 4.  Estimated Clock Skew and Actual Clock Skew. Source: [7]. 
E. CONFIDENCE INTERVALS 
Due to the uncertainties in the estimated clock skews from the randomness of 
collected data, the true mean value of the clock skew   cannot be directly measured or 
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known [5]. The estimated clock skews are a continuous random variable x  and assumed 
to be Gaussian with a density function ( )Xf x  [5]. A confidence interval gives a range 
[ , ]L UC C  in which the true mean value of the clock skew falls within a specified 
probability of 1   [5]. The range of said interval is defined as 
 [ ] 1L UP C z C     , (5) 
where   is the acceptable error for 0 1   [18]. The bounds of a confidence interval 
for a given density function ( )Xf x , true mean  , and acceptable error   are shown in 
Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.  The Bounds LC  and UC  of the Confidence Intervals for a Given 
Density Function with a True Mean   and Acceptable Error  . 
Source: [5]. 


















  .  (7) 
If a given clock skew falls within the bounds of the confidence interval from an IP 
address, it can then be argued that the given clock skew originated from the same device 
with the probability of 1  .  
 To summarize, in this chapter we introduced SDN and the various planes and 
APIs that make up the network. We then defined multi-homed hosts and examined how 
they can be used to bypass security separation protocols. We also discussed TCP 
timestamp options, their purpose, and how they are generated in a Linux Kernel. The 
chapter defined clock skew and described confidence intervals. The next chapter will 
look at the methodology to remotely detect a multi-homed device on a SDN. 
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III. MULTI-HOMED MULTI-OS DEVICE DETECTION USING 
CLOCK SKEW 
The overall objective of this research is to validate multi-homed detection 
methods when applied to a larger set of devices and operating systems as compared to the 
devices used in [5]. A multi-homed host has multiple NICs installed and can be 
connected to one or more networks with each NIC having a unique IP address. TCP 
timestamps will be passively collected at the fingerprinter. Once the data is collected, it 
will be used to determine a clock skew for each IP address on the network. The resultant 
clock skews will then be compared to one another to determine which IP addresses are 
multi-homed.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows; first, we propose the general 
scheme for multi-homed device detection based on the estimated clock skew for a given 
IP address. We then discuss the clock skew estimation from data collected from both the 
fingerprinter and fingerprintee. Next, we describe how linear programming and linear 
regression methods can be used to estimate the clock skew. Finally, we examine the 
confidence interval for 95% confidence based on a Gaussian distribution. 
A. PROPOSED SCHEME 
A graphical representation of the proposed scheme is depicted in Figure 6 and is 
similar in approach to the one taken in Martin’s work [5]. First, we will passively collect 
TCP timestamp data. With this data, we can determine the estimated clock skew for a 
given IP address as it has been shown that the clock skew is consistent and unique 
enough to identify physical devices remotely [6]. Then the estimated clock skew will be 
used to fingerprint a host by calculating confidence intervals and determining which 
clock skews fall within the bounds of the intervals. The hosts whose IP addresses fall 
within the confidence interval will be examined further to determine if the host is multi-
homed. Individual details with regards to the steps of Figure 6 are described in further 














Figure 6.  General Diagram of Proposed Scheme. Adapted from [5]. 
B. TRAFFIC COLLECTION 
A general SDN is given in Figure 7. In this general network, a controller is 
connected to one or more switches that form the base of the data plane. The connections 
between the controller and the switches make up the southbound API as discussed in 
Chapter II. The northbound API is not shown in the diagram as the application layer lies 
within the controller and application commands are pushed to the controller via software 
running on the controller. The hosts are connected to the switches as prescribed by the 
testing setup. The hosts are a combination of a diverse mixture of hardware 
configurations with various operating systems installed based on the type of testing 
required. The number of dual-homed and triple-homed connections from the hosts also 
depends on the testing parameters that will need to be established prior to testing. The 
fingerprinter will passively collect traffic as shown in Figure 7.  
Three general steps are required to ensure that TCP timestamp data is received at 
the fingerprinter. First, the operating system must have the TCP timestamp option 
enabled as some operating systems do not enable TCP timestamp option by default [7]. 
Second, the operating system must then have an available TCP port upon which the TCP 
connection will be established. If the TCP port is not listening for traffic, then the host 
device will not allow the data to be processed. Finally, the host operating system must 
have proper firewall rules established to ensure that TCP connections are not blocked.  
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Figure 7.  Generic Network Configuration. Adapted from [5]. 
For the purposes of this research, the term multi-homed will cover both dual and 
triple-homed devices. For triple-homed devices, we will also conduct vertical testing. 
Vertical testing is defined as maintaining the device hardware constant while changing 
the installed operating system to determine the clock skew of the hardware. By keeping 
the hardware constant and varying the operating system, we can examine any differences 
in estimated clock skews.  
C. CLOCK SKEW DETERMINATION 
Clock skew calculation is an essential step in multi-homed detection and is the 
third block of the proposed scheme in Figure 6. The network traffic analyzed must 
contain TCP timestamp information for clock skew estimation as discussed in Chapter II. 
After a trace   of TCP timestamp data has been collected from all target IP addresses on 
the network, clock skews can be calculated using the procedure outlined in [5], [6]. Let it  
be the time that the fingerprinter observed the 
t hi  packet in   and let i  be the TCP 
timestamp within the 
t hi packet. The observed time offset is calculated by 
 1i ix t t  ,  (8) 
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where ix  is the observed time difference between the 
t hi  packet and the observed time of 






 ,  (9) 
where i  is the timestamp of the 
t hi  packet, 1  is the first timestamp in  , and f  is the 
operating frequency of the fingerprintee clock. After the observed time offset and 
timestamp offset are known, the observed offset iy  of the 
t hi  packet is calculated by  
 i i iy w x  .  (10) 
Let us now define O  as a set of offsets corresponding to the trace   and is 
represented by the following notation 
 {( , ) : {1,..., }}i iO x y i N   ,  (11) 
where N  is the number of packets in   and ( , )i ix y  is determined in (8) and (10), 
respectively. We assume that O  is differentiable in time, thus we can model the data as 
a line with the following form  
 i ix y   .  (12) 
The estimated clock skew is the slope of the line in (12). To determine the slope, we will 
use linear programming and linear regression methods as described in the following 
sections.  
1. Linear Programming 
One method to calculate the estimated clock skew for a given set of offsets O  is 













   . (13) 
The solution in Equation (13) yields the slope of the clock skew   [6]. Linear 
programming solutions contain both an upper bound and a lower bound solution. Only 
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the upper-bound line solution is used since all of the timestamps are positive valued and 
progress forward in time [6]. The clock skew is calculated by evaluating Equation (13) 
for each IP address on the network. 
2. Linear Regression 
A second method to calculate clock skew estimations is to use linear regression 
where a best fit line is applied to a set of offsets O . The solution for linear regression is 
in the form of x y   . Similar to linear programming, the clock skew is the slope of 
the output line. Linear regression presents several advantages over linear programming: it 
is less computationally intensive and less complex to implement. The disadvantage of 
linear regression is that variable network delays may cause inaccuracies to clock skew 
values [6]. For linear regression method to be used, network delays must be smaller than 
the resolution of the host system clock to generate the timestamp clock. The clock skews 
from linear regression will be compared to the clock skews from the linear programming 
to provide a comparison between the two methods.  
D. DETECTION OF MULTI-HOMED HOSTS 
Multi-homed detection is the last step of the proposed scheme in Figure 6. After 
clock skew estimations are completed, we must compare the estimated clock skews to 
determine which IP addresses belong to potential multi-homed devices. As discussed in 
Section E, Chapter II, the clock skews are random variables, which are assumed to have a 
Gaussian distribution [5], [18]. 
Using a distribution of clock skews from multiple trials, we calculate the mean 
clock skew and a confidence interval for each IP address. The sample mean for the 
thi  












    (14) 
where i  is the estimated clock skew for the 
thi  host and n  is the number of trials [18].  
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We then determine if the sample mean im  falls within 
t hj  host confidence interval  
 , ,L j i U jC m C  .  (15) 
If im  falls within the bounds of 
t hj  hosts confidence interval, then it can be 
assumed that the 
t hi  and 
t hj  originated from the same device with a confidence of 1  . 
Conversely, if im  does not fall within the bounds of (9), it can be assumed that 
t hi  and 
t hj  did not originate from the same device. The detection flow chart is summarized in 
Figure 8.  
Clock Skew
Data
Determine the sample 






Figure 8.  Detection Flow Chart. Source: [5]. 
To summarize, this chapter laid out a detailed description of the proposed scheme 
to support the objective of this thesis. The scheme requires timestamped responses within 
the TCP header options field. From the observed timestamps, clock skews between the 
fingerprinter and target host are calculated using linear programming and linear 
regression methods. The clock skew is a unique value for a given device for which a 
confidence interval can be determined. The confidence interval provides a means to 
detect a multi-homed device on a network. The next two chapters will discuss the 





IV. DUAL-HOMED TESTING AND RESULTS 
The proposed scheme for remote collection and calculation of clock skews and 
detecting multi-homed devices from TCP timestamps was introduced in Chapter III. This 
chapter is an extension of those ideas, beginning with a description of the network 
configuration to remotely identify dual-homed devices in an SDN environment. Specific 
methods used to passively capture traffic are also presented in this chapter. After the TCP 
traffic is captured, we calculated the clock skews for all host IP addresses on the network 
by using linear programming and linear regression methods. Once all of the clock skews 
have been determined, we applied confidence interval analysis to identify multi-homed 
hosts. This chapter will focus on dual-homed testing while Chapter V will discuss triple-
homed testing and results. 
A. TEST BED 
The test bed laid out in this chapter describes the actual SDN network and 
components used to validate the proposed scheme. These components are used for 
generating TCP timestamps, passively collecting said timestamps, and calculating clock 
skew estimations. After the clock skews are calculated for each IP address, a confidence 
interval is used to determine whether an IP address belongs to a given host.  
1. Network Setup for Dual-Homed Testing 
The components, configuration of installed operating systems, and the associated 
static IP address, which formed the test bed for dual-homed testing, are listed in Table 1 
and shown in Figure 9. The switch was a HP 3800 used to connect all of the hosts within 
the network with a subnet mask of 255.255.255.0. There were seven Raspberry Pi 3 
Model Bs on the network corresponding to hosts 1–7. All of the Raspberry Pis had 
Ubuntu MATE 16.04 LTS installed for the operating system. Hosts 1–6 were single-
homed devices and added to the network to show that these devices did not interfere with 
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the data collection of the dual-homed devices. Host 7 was the only dual-homed Raspberry 
Pi on the network.  
Table 1.   Summary of Hosts for Dual-Homed Testing 
Host Device/Hardware Operating System IP Address 1 IP Address 2 
1 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.1 - 
2 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.2 - 
3 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.3 - 
4 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.4 - 
5 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.5 - 
6 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.6 - 
7 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.10 10.10.8.11 
8 Dell Latitude E6430 Windows 7 10.10.8.12 10.10.8.13 
9 Dell Latitude E5420 Fedora 26 10.10.8.14 10.10.8.15 
10 Dell Latitude E6540 Linux Mint 18.1 10.10.8.16 10.10.8.17 
11 MacBook Pro OSX 10.11.3 El Capitan 10.10.8.18 10.10.8.19 
12 Lenovo IdeaPad U430 Windows 10 10.10.8.20 10.10.8.21 






















































Figure 9.  SDN Test Bed for Dual-Homed Testing 
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Hosts 8–13 were laptops with operating systems configured in accordance with 
Table 1 and shown in Figure 9. The operating systems selected for testing represent a 
wide range of the common operating systems available at the time. With the exception of 
OS X 10.6.3 Snow Leopard, operating systems that are no longer supported by the 
vendor were not selected due to lack of support. The laptops were dual-homed devices 
with two static IP addresses. To establish dual connections, the first connection used the 
devices built-in Ethernet port. The second connection was established by using a USB 
Ethernet adapter. The fingerprinter was a Dell T1600 running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS and 
directly connected to the HP 3800. The devices had to be configured after being 
connected to the network. 
2. Host Preparation 
Each host had to be independently setup and verified to ensure it would 
communicate properly within the SDN network. The devices required several steps to 
properly handle TCP timestamp requests and subsequently respond to said request. To 
ensure that a device was configured properly to communicate within the network, all 
hosts required the following steps to be taken: 
1. Static assignment of IP address 
2. Firewall rules to allow inbound and outbound TCP traffic 
3. TCP port activation 
The test bed did not have a DHCP server installed on the network, thus IP 
addresses were statically assigned. This served to minimize confusion in the event a new 
IP address was automatically assigned to a NIC. To prevent the automatic blocking of 
TCP timestamp requests, the rules within the firewalls were adjusted such that TCP 
requests were not blocked. The ports on the target device must also be active and 
listening for traffic. If the ports are not activated, a given device will ignore the request 
and no data will be transmitted.  
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There may be cases where an operating system does not enable RFC 1323 TCP 
timestamp by default [7]. In those cases, TCP timestamp reporting must be manually 
enabled using instructions specified by the operating systems vendors.  
B. TRAFFIC GENERATION AND COLLECTION 
Hping3 was used to generate traffic between the fingerprinter and fingerprintee. It 
is a command-line TCP/IP packet assembler and analyzer written by Salvatore Sanfilippo 
and distributed to Kali Linux [19]. Hping3 establishes a TCP connection with the target 
host and enables the TCP timestamp option field. Traffic was established at the default 
rate of one request per second and allows for network traffic to be observed by 
Wireshark. 
The responses from the hosts were captured and filtered using Wireshark. Filters 
in Wireshark were set to show only TCP traffic that contained TSVal and TSecr values. If 
a host TSVal and TSecr were blank in the TCP options segment of the TCP return, then 
the host network configuration needed to be set in accordance with the steps stated in 
Section A.2 of this chapter.  
C. DUAL-HOMED CLOCK SKEW RESULTS 
Once the test traffic was collected via Wireshark, the data then had to be imported 
into MATLAB. The traffic generator, hping3, sends a TCP timestamp request every 
second to a specified IP address and port. During an experimental trial, at least 3600 
samples per IP address were collected, which is approximately 60 minutes of data 
collection. The 3600-sample minimum ensured that the collection had enough data points 
to provide for stable estimation and minimized any network jitter that could potentially 
affect clock skew estimations.  
To determine the clock skews using linear programming for each host, the 
MATLAB function linprog was applied to the clock offset values as given in (11). 
Likewise, to determine clock skews with linear regression, the MATLAB function fit was 
used with a linear polynomial as the fit type object. The output of both clock skew 
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calculation methods yielded a solution in the form yx   , where   is the clock 
skew and   is the y-intercept. The MATLAB code for clock skew determination is in 
Appendix A. The built-in MATLAB functions tic and toc were used to compute the 
computational times for linear programming and linear regression. For the 3600-sample 
trial, the linear regression method was 2-3 times faster than the linear programming 
method. 
The clock skew for each host was calculated for each 3600-sample trial. Only the 
upper-bound solution was considered, as all of the delays between the network hosts and 
the fingerprinter were positive and progressed forward in time as discussed in Section D, 
Chapter III. The upper-bound solution for a dual-homed Raspberry Pi 3 running Ubuntu 
Mate 16.04 LTS corresponding to IP address 10.10.8.11 is shown in Figure 8. The linear 
programming slope was 13.9614 ppm and the linear regression method yielded similar 
results with an estimated clock skew of 13.9712 ppm. The red dots, in Figure 8, are the 
individual time offsets between the host and fingerprinter, and the blue line is the clock 
skew solution for the slope as calculated by the fingerprinter using the linear 
programming method. 
  
Figure 10.  Upper-Bound Clock Skew Solution for Host 7 (10.10.8.11) over a 
Single Trial 
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Comparing the slopes of all hosts in a single trial shows the variation of clock 
skews present within the network. Each host has an independent slope that is unique to 
the host [6], [7]. A plot of all of the dual-homed hosts clock skews from a single trial is 
shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.  Clock Skews of All Hosts for a Single Trial 
By zooming into Figure 11, we can observe more detail associated with the dual-
homed hosts. The IP addresses that originate from the same host have the same slope but 
not necessarily the same y-intercept as shown in Figure 12. The difference in the location 
of the y-intercept is due to timestamp delay ( )t  as discussed in Section D, Chapter III. 
The solid lines in Figure 12 are single-homed and the hashed or dotted lines are those that 
are dual-homed. For ease of comparison, IP addresses originating from the same host are 
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colored with the same color. For example, the orange arrow on the graph points to two 
parallel lines that correspond to host 9 (IP addresses 10.10.8.14 and 10.10.8.15). The two 
lines share similar clock skews (slopes) at 7.1764 and 7.1761 ppm, respectively. They are 
only shifted in the y-direction due to differences in timestamp delays ( )t . 
 
Figure 12.  Zoomed-in View of All Clock Skews from Figure 11 over a Single 
Trial 
The mean clock skew from both linear programming and linear regression for 
each IP address is listed in Table 2. It can be seen in Table 2 that the estimated clock 
skews from both the linear programming and linear regression appear to agree with one 
another with the exception of host 11. A deeper examination of host 11 is conducted later 




Table 2.   Mean Clock Skews for All Hosts Using Linear Programming and 
Linear Regression (in ppm) 







1 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.1 13.0434 13.0408 
2 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.2 9.6767 9.5989 
3 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.3 15.0640 15.0653 
4 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.4 14.4238 14.4148 
5 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.5 10.8369 10.5269 
6 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 10.10.8.6 15.9289 15.9306 
7 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Ubuntu MATE 16.04 
10.10.8.10 13.9486 13.9480 
10.10.8.11 13.9493 13.9493 
8 Dell Latitude E6430 Windows 7 
10.10.8.12 -4.6413 -4.6403 
10.10.8.13 -4.6411 -4.6384 
9 Dell Latitude E5420 Fedora 26 
10.10.8.14 7.1764 7.1760 
10.10.8.15 7.1761 7.1715 
10 Dell Latitude E6540 Linux Mint 18.1 
10.10.8.16 6.5648 6.5479 
10.10.8.17 6.5657 6.5481 
11 MacBook Pro 
OSX 10.11.3 El 
Capitan 
10.10.8.18 85.4578 90.8211 
10.10.8.19 85.4482 96.1752 
12 Lenovo IdeaPad U430 Windows 10 
10.10.8.20 18.2444 18.2516 
10.10.8.21 18.2450 18.3122 
13 MacBook Pro 
OSX 10.6.3 Snow 
Leopard 
10.10.8.24 -1227.6546 -1230.4099 




The calculated clock skews are random variables and as such approach a Gaussian 
distribution when a large number of trials are conducted [5]. In this experiment, we 
conducted 174 trials for dual-homed devices. A histogram of host 3 clock skews is shown 
in Figure 13. It can be seen in Figure 13 that the clock skews reasonably resemble the 
Gaussian shape. Host 3 histogram is representative of all of the hosts tested with the 
exception of host 11.  
  
Figure 13.  Histogram of the Estimated Clock Skews for Host 3 (10.10.8.3) 
after 174 Trials 
The histogram of the clock skews of host 11 did not have a Gaussian shape, 
unlike the other hosts tested on the network. The two IP addresses assigned to host 11 
were 10.10.8.18 and 10.10.8.19, and both yielded similar bi-modal histograms. The 
histogram from 10.10.8.19 is shown in Figure 14. This device was a MacBook Pro 
running OS X 10.11.3 El Capitan, which was released in 2015. Due to the instability of 
calculated clock skews, we were unable to fingerprint OS X 10.11.3 El Capitan. The 
instability of OS X is consistent with the findings from [7] where they observed clock 
skew changes on unknown occasions. 
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Figure 14.  Histogram of the Estimated Clock Skews for Host 11 (10.10.8.19) 
Running OS X 10.11.3 Displaying Non-Gaussian Shape after 
174 Trials 
Comparatively, host 13 was a different MacBook Pro running OS X 10.6.3 Snow 
Leopard released in 2009. The histogram for the MacBook Pro running Snow Leopard is 
shown in Figure 15. Here, host 13 returned consistent clock skews whose histogram 
displayed a Gaussian shape similar to the non-Mac hosts. It did not have a bi-modal 
distribution as the El Capitan device presented in Figure 14. Based on the results, 
sometime between the release of Snow Leopard in 2009 and El Capitan in 2015, Apple 
altered the way timestamps are reported. Unfortunately, OS X is a proprietary operating 




Figure 15.  Histogram of Estimated Clock Skews for Host 13 (10.10.8.24) 
Running OS X 10.6.3 Displaying a Gaussian Shape after 174 
Trials 
After the clock skews of all IP addresses have been calculated, a confidence 
interval is determined for each IP address. We will use this interval to detect which IP 
addresses are dual-homed. 
D. DETECTION OF DUAL-HOMED HOSTS 
In Section E, Chapter III, we discussed the detection of multi-homed hosts using 
the estimated clock skews and a confidence interval of 1  . For detection purposes,   
was selected to be 0.05 or 5%. The 95% confidence interval represents two standard 
deviations if the clock skews were a Gaussian distribution and is consistent with the 
confidence intervals used in [5]. After 174 trials were conducted and clock skews were 
calculated for each trial, a mean clock skew and confidence interval were calculated for 
each IP address. The upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval were determined 
using the paramci function in MATLAB. The code for this computation is included in 
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Appendix B. If the mean clock skew falls within the range of the bands, the IP addresses 
can be identified as coming from that host with a 95% percent confidence. 
The results for the confidence interval testing are listed in Table 3. From the table, 
it can be shown that the single-homed devices had estimated clock skews that did not 
correspond to another device, indicating that they were not multi-homed. Also from the 
table, six of the seven dual-homed hosts had two clock skews that fell within the range of 
the 95% confidence interval of their two IP addresses, which indicate that they were 
multi-homed. The large width of the confidence interval for host 11 is a direct result of 
the instability of clock skews shown in Figure 14. For confidence interval detection, we 
assumed that the resultant clock skews were Gaussian in nature. Host 11 histogram was 
bi-modal and did not resemble a bell curve, thus we were unable to apply our proposed 
scheme for multi-homed detection.  
Table 3.   Linear Programming: Upper and Lower Bounds of the 95% 
Confidence Interval for the Clock Skews of All Hosts 
Host IP Address 
UpperC  
Mean Clock 
Skew  LowerC  
1 10.10.8.1 13.0581 13.0439 13.0297 
2 10.10.8.2 9.7448 9.6775 9.6103 
3 10.10.8.3 15.0749 15.0641 15.0532 
4 10.10.8.4 14.4429 14.4241 14.4052 
5 10.10.8.5 11.0082 10.8393 10.6704 
6 10.10.8.6 15.9405 15.9291 15.9177 
7 
10.10.8.10 13.9569 13.9489 13.9409 
10.10.8.11 13.9575 13.9496 13.9418 
8 
10.10.8.12 -4.6216 -4.6416 -4.6615 
10.10.8.13 -4.622 -4.6413 -4.6607 
9 
10.10.8.14 7.1852 7.1768 7.1685 
10.10.8.15 7.1849 7.1765 7.1681 
10 
10.10.8.16 6.5822 6.5643 6.5464 
10.10.8.17 6.5831 6.5651 6.5472 
11 
10.10.8.18 148.7956 83.5445 18.2935 
10.10.8.19 148.786 83.5335 18.2809 
12 
10.10.8.20 18.2564 18.2447 18.2331 
10.10.8.21 18.2571 18.2456 18.234 
13 
10.10.8.24 -1235.0783 -1239.7471 -1244.4159 
10.10.8.25 -1235.077 -1239.7429 -1244.4089 
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For the clock skews that were determined using the linear regression method, the 
results for the upper and lower bounds for the 95% confidence interval are shown in 
Table 5. Similar to the linear programming results, the single-homed devices all had 
estimated clock skews that did not correspond to another device. From Table 5, we can 
also see that six of the seven dual-homed devices were multi-homed. Host 11 confidence 
interval spans more than 130 ppm due to the bi-modal shape and is too wide for useful 
detection. Like the linear programming method, linear regression clock skew calculation 
did not allow us to fingerprint host 11.  
Table 4.   Linear Regression: Upper and Lower Bounds of the 95% Confidence 
Interval for the Clock Skews of All Hosts 
Host IP Address 
UpperC  
Mean Clock 
Skew  LowerC  
1 10.10.8.1 13.0596 13.0449 13.0302 
2 10.10.8.2 9.6086 9.5989 9.5893 
3 10.10.8.3 15.0766 15.0654 15.0542 
4 10.10.8.4 14.4274 14.4149 14.4025 
5 10.10.8.5 10.5404 10.5273 10.5142 
6 10.10.8.6 15.9427 15.9311 15.9194 
7 
10.10.8.10 13.9563 13.9483 13.9402 
10.10.8.11 13.9575 13.9495 13.9415 
8 
10.10.8.12 -4.6205 -4.6404 -4.6603 
10.10.8.13 -4.6178 -4.6387 -4.6597 
9 
10.10.8.14 7.1844 7.1763 7.1683 
10.10.8.15 7.1821 7.1719 7.1617 
10 
10.10.8.16 6.6142 6.5445 6.4748 
10.10.8.17 6.617 6.5449 6.4728 
11 
10.10.8.18 153.948 88.965 23.982 
10.10.8.19 159.1458 94.3519 29.5579 
12 
10.10.8.20 18.2666 18.2521 18.2375 
10.10.8.21 18.4375 18.3131 18.1888 
13 
10.10.8.24 -1238.0777 -1242.5625 -1247.0473 




Upon closer inspection of Table 3 and Table 4, it appears that the linear 
programming and the linear regression clock skew mean, upper, and lower confidence 
interval bounds are very similar. Due to these similarities, we will only discuss the 
graphical portion of the linear programming results in the following.  
We plotted the mean clock skews and the confidence intervals for all IP addresses 
and displayed that data in Figure 16. Notably, the upper and lower confidence interval 
bounds for host 11 (IP address 10.10.8.18 and 10.10.8.19) cover a range of approximately 
130 ppm. Due to the scale of Figure 16, the calculated confidence intervals appear as 
points rather than intervals.  
 
Figure 16.  95% Confidence Interval for the Estimated Clock Skews of All 
Hosts after 174 Trials 
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In Figure 17, we zoomed in on Figure 16 to focus on host 7 (IP addresses 
10.10.8.10 and 10.10.8.11). The blue horizontal line is the confidence interval. Although 
it appears to be a single line, there are in fact two. The inset displayed further zooms in 
on the clock skews of host 7 showing the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence 
interval. Host 7 confidence interval only overlaps with its dual-homed counterpart and 
does not overlap with the other IP addresses.  
Figure 17.  Confidence Interval of Host 7 (10.10.8.10) Compared to the Mean 
Values of All Clock Skews Calculated 
A zoomed-in view of the confidence interval of host 11 (IP addresses 10.10.8.18 
and 10.10.8.19) running OS X El Capitan is shown in Figure 18. The upper and lower 












and do not provide a reliable confidence interval for detection. The other hosts had 
intervals that generally spanned less than 0.3 ppm with the second largest span of 9 ppm 
for host 13. With the exception of host 11, the estimated clock skews calculated from 
linear programming and linear optimization provided reliable results that allowed us to 
successfully detect all multi-homed devices within the network. 
 
Figure 18.  Confidence Interval of Host 11 (10.10.8.18) Compared to the 
Mean Values of All Clock Skews Calculated 
This chapter focused on detecting dual-homed devices using calculated clock 
skews. A detailed description of the test bed, testing, and results was presented. The 
testing and analysis revealed that remote multi-homed detection is possible if the target 
clock skews result in a Gaussian shape. When the host histogram does not approach a 
Gaussian shape, the confidence interval detection method proposed in Chapter III is not 
sufficient. The next chapter focuses on expanding discussed detection methods to triple-














V. TRIPLE–HOMED TESTING AND RESULTS 
The dual-homed test bed was altered for triple-home and vertical testing. The 
chapter begins with a description of the triple-homed test bed. A triple-homed device 
consists of three separate Ethernet connections that are made using a combination of the 
built-in Ethernet port and two additional USB Ethernet NICs. Vertical testing is 
completed by maintaining constant hardware configuration on a device and varying the 
operating system.  
The triple-homed testing was divided into three phases. In each phase, a different 
set of operating systems is tested while keeping the hardware configuration the same. 
Triple-homed vertical testing is conducted to determine the effects the operating system 
has on the clock skew and subsequent confidence interval based detection.  
A. TRIPLE–HOMED TEST BED 
In this network, we removed all single and dual-homed devices and tested three 
triple-homed devices. The testing was done in three phases. In each phase, a different 
operating system was installed on the host device. The first phase consisted of Windows 
10, Windows 7, and Linux Mint 18.1. The second phase tested three versions of Ubuntu 
with various Linux kernels. The third phase consisted of freeBSD 12.0 installed on all 
devices. The setup for the network is summarized in Table 5, listing the host number, the 
various operating systems installed, and the IP addresses assigned to that device. To 
avoid confusion with the host numbers used in Chapter IV, the host numbers for testing 
in this chapter begin with 101.  
A general network diagram for the triple-homed testing is shown in Figure 19, 
which lists the devices used, host number, and the IP addresses that were assigned. The 
switch and fingerprinter used for TCP traffic generation and traffic collection are the 
same as the ones used in Chapter IV.  
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Table 5.   Summary of Hosts and Operating Systems for Triple-Homed and 
Vertical Testing 












































Figure 19.  SDN Test Bed for Triple-Homed Testing 
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B. TRIPLE-HOMED CLOCK SKEW RESULTS 
TCP timestamp data was generated, collected, and processed in the same manner 
as the dual-homed case. Each trial had a minimum of 3600 samples per IP address, which 
was approximately 60 minutes of data collection in a given trial. Using linear 
programming and linear regression methods, clock skews were calculated. The results 
from each IP address were compared to one another to determine which device the 
estimated clock skews originated from. The same linear programming and linear 
regression methods used for dual-homed testing were also used for the triple-homed case. 
For consistency between the results, only the upper solution was considered. The results 
from phase one and phase two will be presented together as they had similar results.  
1. Phase One and Phase Two Results
The estimated clock skews for all IP addresses in the first two phases behaved 
similarly to the dual-homed cases. An example of the output from host 103 (IP address 
10.10.8.38), running Linux Mint 18.1, is shown in Figure 20. The blue line is the upper 
bound solution of linear programming, and the red dots are the individual observed 
offsets. 
Clock skews originating from the same device will have the same slope [5]. All 
hosts clock skews from phase one testing are shown in Figure 21. Due to the similarities 
and consistent results between phase one and two, we will only discuss the results of 
phase one testing. Each of the lines represents an IP address and similar colored lines 
originate from the same device. Graphically, it can be seen that the parallel clock skews 
for the triple-homed hosts have the same slope. Looking at host 101, the three blue lines 
all had a slope of about 16.0 ppm. Hosts 102 (green) and 103 (magenta) had negative 
slopes of 8.1  and 10.9 , respectively. Similar to the dual-homed case, the difference in 
the location of the y-intercept is due to the measured timestamp delay ( )t .  
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Figure 20.  Upper-Bound Clock Skew Solution for Triple-Homed Host 103 
(10.10.8.11) Running Linux Mint 18.1 for a Single Trial during 
Phase One Testing 



















The mean clock skew values for all hosts in phase one and phase two testing are 
listed in Table 6 and Table 7, respectively. The clock skews for hosts 102 and 103 were 
negative values in phase one testing and switch to positive values for phase two testing as 
shown in Tables 6 and 7. The hardware configuration remained the same for all triple-
homed hosts, thus the change in slope can be attributed to a change in the operating 
system. As expected, the IP addresses that share a host all had similar clock skews to one 
another. It can be noted that in these two phases, the estimated clock skews from both the 
linear programming and linear regression methods agree with one another.  
The MATLAB functions tic and toc were used to calculate the computational time 
to execute the linear programming and linear regression methods. Similar to the dual-
homed case, the linear regression computation time was 2-3 times faster than the linear 
programming method. This time difference is attributed to the differences in complexity 
of the two methods. Before we move onto triple-homed detection using confidence 
intervals, we will discuss the clock skew histograms of phase one and phase two results 
after 150 trials. 
Table 6.   Phase One: Mean Clock Skews for All Hosts Using Linear 
Programming and Linear Regression (in ppm) 
Phase One 











10.10.8.31 16.0558 16.0680 
10.10.8.32 16.0573 16.0687 





10.10.8.34 -8.1262 -8.1360 
10.10.8.35 -8.1252 -8.1582 




Linux Mint 18.1 
10.10.8.37 -10.9307 -10.9795 
10.10.8.38 -10.9333 -10.9730 
10.10.8.39 -10.9352 -10.9724 
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Table 7.   Phase Two: Mean Clock Skew for All Hosts Using Linear 
Programming and Linear Regression (in ppm) 
Phase Two 









10.10.8.31 17.1122 17.1429 
10.10.8.32 17.1114 17.1468 





10.10.8.34 13.7592 13.6835 
10.10.8.35 13.7600 13.6574 





10.10.8.37 10.3061 10.3024 
10.10.8.38 10.3077 10.3023 
10.10.8.39 10.3061 10.3043 
 
After 150 trials were conducted for each phase, a histogram for each IP address 
was reviewed. Histograms of all of the hosts had a Gaussian-like shape and are similar to 
those of the dual-homed hosts. A representative histogram generated is presented in 
Figure 22 from host 101 (IP address 10.10.8.33) running Windows 10. Before we move 
to confidence interval based detection, we will review the results of phase three testing. 
 
Figure 22.  Histogram of Estimated Clock Skews for Host 101 (10.10.8.33) 
Running Windows 10 Displaying a Gaussian Shape after 150 
Trials 
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2. Phase Three Results
FreeBSD 12.0 was installed on all three triple-homed devices for phase three 
testing. TCP timestamp data was collected in the same manner as in the previous two 
phases. The estimated clock skews varied on the order of 
610 ppm, unlike the triple-
homed clock skews from phases one and two, which presented stable and consistent 
clock skews. The upper-bound solution for host 103 (IP address 10.10.8.38) with 
timestamp offsets varied between 
64 10   and 61.6 10  seconds and is shown in Figure 
23. All IP addresses produced similar upper-bound clock skew solutions as the one in
Figure 24. 
To generate TCP traffic, hping3 is called once per second. Each time it is called, it 
creates a TCP connection with the host, sends one packet to retrieve a TCP timestamp, 
and immediately closes the connection. It appears that freeBSD 12.0 is randomly 
assigning a timestamp value each time a TCP connection is made to the host causing 
large variations in the offset. Randomized TCP timestamps explains the extreme 
variations of timestamp offsets observed in Figure 23. 
Figure 23.  Upper-Bound Solution for Host 102 (10.10.8.38) Running 
freeBSD 12.0 over a Single Trial 
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The instability of the clock skews for freeBSD 12.0 is apparent when we plot all 
of the estimated clock skews from a single trial as shown in Figure 24. Similar to the 
color scheme used in Figure 21, each color represents a different host. Looking at host 
103 (magenta lines), they clearly are not parallel as the clock skews cross one another 
between 3 and 4 seconds. Host 101 only has two lines plotted as the third line had a y-
intercept below
43 10  . Unlike the clock skews from phase one and phase two, the clock 
skews originating from the same host are not parallel. Due to the instability of the clock 
skews, the current method of confidence interval detection is not sufficient to fingerprint 
devices running freeBSD 12.0.  
 
Figure 24.  Non-parallel Clock Skews from a Single Trial during 
Phase Three Testing 
The results are summarized in Table 8. It can be seen that the clock skews from 
the same host are not similar. For example, looking at host 101, the mean clock skews 
from linear programming ranges from a high of 1234354.91 ppm to a low of 
2167570.96  ppm. For the same host, the linear regression mean clock skews range 
between 75923751.99  ppm and 32972297.96  ppm. Hosts 102 and 103 also had a wide 
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variation in the mean clock skews from both linear programming and linear regression. 
Now that we have calculated mean clock skew data from all of the phases, we can apply 
them to our detection scheme to determine which IP addresses are triple-homed.  
Table 8.   Phase Three: Mean Clock Skews for All Hosts Using Linear 
Programming and Linear Regression (in ppm) 
Phase Three 










10.10.8.31 1234354.91 75923751.99 
10.10.8.32 -867187.70 -32972297.96 





10.10.8.34 -598920.03 1667652.00 
10.10.8.35 -1985387.07 7238501.11 





10.10.8.37 -816815.26 -53436558.43 
10.10.8.38 -1878372.71 -22952129.85 
10.10.8.39 -927646.91 7604539.66 
C. DETECTION OF TRIPLE-HOMED HOSTS 
In the previous chapter, we looked at detecting dual-homed devices by 
determining the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval from multiple trials. 
We apply the same method to detect triple-homed hosts. The confidence intervals were 
calculated for both the linear programming and linear regression methods, and like the 
dual-homed confidence interval results, both methodologies produced similar results for 
phases one and two. Due to the similarities in interval values, only the linear 
programming results will be shown here. The upper and lower confidence interval 
bounds from both methods are summarized in Tables 9–11. 
Looking at Tables 9 and 10, the mean clock skews from phase one and phase two 
testing are stable and consistent within a host. For example, in phase two testing, host 103 
mean clock skew was 10.3061, 10.3077, and 10.3061 ppm across different interfaces. 
These clock skews are within 0.002 ppm with one another. The other hosts within phase 
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one and phase two shared consistent results within the same host. The upper and lower 
confidence bounds were also consistent within a host from phase one and phase two. 
Looking at Tables 9 and 10, we can see that the upper and lower confidence intervals are 
all within 0.4% of their associated mean clock skew. As discussed in the previous 
section, the phase three results (shown in Table 11) were not as consistent as the phase 
one and phase two results. 
Table 9.   Phase One: Upper and Lower Bounds of the 95% Confidence 





IP Address UpperC  
Mean Clock 
Skew 






10.10.8.31 16.0631 16.0558 16.0485 
10.10.8.32 16.0653 16.0573 16.0493 






10.10.8.34 -8.1139 -8.1262 -8.1384 
10.10.8.35 -8.1125 -8.1252 -8.1379 






10.10.8.37 -10.9110 -10.9307 -10.9505 
10.10.8.38 -10.9141 -10.9333 -10.9525 
10.10.8.39 -10.9159 -10.9352 -10.9546 
Table 10.   Phase Two: Upper and Lower Bounds of the 95% Confidence 





IP Address  UpperC  
Mean Clock 
Skew 






10.10.8.31 17.1208 17.1122 17.1036 
10.10.8.32 17.1202 17.1114 17.1027 






10.10.8.34 13.7732 13.7592 13.7452 
10.10.8.35 13.7737 13.7600 13.7462 






10.10.8.37 10.3250 10.3061 10.2873 
10.10.8.38 10.3268 10.3077 10.2887 
10.10.8.39 10.3252 10.3061 10.2870 
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Table 11.   Phase Three: Upper and Lower Bounds of the 95% Confidence 














10.10.8.31 4537083.91 1234354.91 -2068374.10 
10.10.8.32 250934.89 -867187.70 -1985310.30 






10.10.8.34 -256229.61 -598920.03 -941610.45 
10.10.8.35 -638958.50 -1985387.07 -3331815.63 






10.10.8.37 754059.84 -816815.26 -2387690.36 
10.10.8.38 -57932.72 -1878372.71 -3698812.70 
10.10.8.39 -383871.51 -927646.91 -1471422.30 
The phase three mean clock skew did not produce consistent results. Due to the 
inconsistent clock skews, the upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals varied 
widely within a host. As shown in Table 11 for host 102, the upper bounds ranged from 
2918937.35  ppm to 638958.50  ppm and the lower bounds ranged from 941610.45  
ppm to 3958578.82  ppm. With these extreme ranges, it is not possible to fingerprint a 
device, which will be further shown in the confidence interval plots.  
A plot of the 95% confidence interval is shown in Figure 25 for host 101 (IP 
address 10.10.8.31) during phase one testing. Here, we can see that the confidence 
intervals for the triple-homed case suggest that the IP addresses 10.10.8.31, 10.10.8.32, 
and 10.10.8.33 originated from host 101. It can also be seen that 10.10.8.34, 10.10.8.35, 
and 10.10.8.36 originated from host 102. And finally, 10.10.8.37, 10.10.8.38, and 
10.10.8.39 originated from host 103. This is consistent with the network configuration in 
Figure 19. 
The blue horizontal line is the confidence interval. Although it appears to be a 
single line, there are in fact two. The inset box displayed further zooms in on the clock 
skews of host 101 showing the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval. 
Host 101 confidence interval only overlaps with its triple-homed counterpart and does not 
overlap with the other IP addresses. The scheme for multi-homed detection works for 
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phase one and phase two testing; however, the same scheme does not work for the 
freeBSD devices in phase three. 
 
 
Figure 25.  Confidence Interval of Host 101 (10.10.8.31) Compared to the 
Mean Values of All Clock Skews Calculated 
When looking at the same 95% confidence interval for phase three, the upper and 
lower bounds of the confidence intervals cover a wide clock skew range that is not useful 
for discriminating instances of multi-homed connections. The mean estimated clock 
skews and 95% confidence intervals for all hosts in phase three testing were plotted in 
Figure 26. In the figure, the blue boxes and red stars are the mean clock skews. The 
whiskers are the upper and lower bands of the 95% confidence intervals centered about 
the mean clock skew. The IP addresses in Figure 26 correspond to the hosts listed in 











From Figure 26, we see that IP address 10.10.8.34 (host 102) has the smallest 
95% confidence interval of 685381 ppm. Compare this to the average interval size from 
phase one and phase two testing of 0.027 ppm. The largest confidence interval, in Figure 
26, originates from host 101 (IP address 10.10.8.31) with a value of 
66.605 10  ppm. As 
shown, all hosts running freeBSD 12.0 experienced inconsistent clock skews, which 
resulted in a wide range of confidence interval values. 
Figure 26.  Mean Clock Skews and Confidence Interval Bounds of All Hosts 
during Phase Three Testing 
D. VERTICAL TESTING RESULTS 
The results of the vertical tests for host 101 (Lenovo IdeaPad) are listed in Table 
12. When a device is rebooted to a new operating system, the clock skews change for that
Host 101 Host 102 Host 103 
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host. In Table 12, host 101 has three separate clock skews for each of the operating 
systems that are installed. This supports the idea that the estimated clock skew depends 
on both the imprecisions of the CPU (in manufacturing) and the operating system that is 
running on the device. 
Table 12.   Mean Linear Programming and Linear Regression Clock Skews for 
Host 101 – Lenovo IdeaPad U430 Running Various Operating 
Systems 







10.10.8.31 16.0558 16.0680 
10.10.8.32 16.0573 16.0687 
10.10.8.33 16.0571 16.0684 
Ubuntu 16.04 
10.10.8.34 17.1122 17.1429 
10.10.8.35 17.1114 17.1468 
10.10.8.36 17.1133 17.2005 
freeBSD 12.0 
10.10.8.37 1234354.91 75923751.99 
10.10.8.38 -867187.70 -32972297.96 
10.10.8.39 -2167570.96 7362498.01 
 Both host 102 (Dell Latitude E6430) and host 103 (Dell Latitude E6540) yielded 
similar results in that they showed an analogous trend when the device was rebooted to a 
different operating system; the estimated clock skews differed from operating system to 
operating system while on the same device. The results for host 102 and 103 are in 
Tables 13 and Table 14, respectively. From Table 13, we can see the stability of clock 
skews when the host 102 was running Windows 7 or Ubuntu 14.04. The three clock 
skews within the same operating system are consistent with one another. When host 102 
was running freeBSD 12.0, the clock skews become erratic. The results from host 102 
show that the device displayed different clock skews when a new operating system was 
installed on the device. 
The results in Table 14 show a similar trend that Table 12 and 13 held. The clock 
skews for host 103 also changed when a new operating system was booted onto the 
device. All three hosts shared similar results when booted to a new operating system. The 
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results of vertical testing is consistent with the findings from [7] where they observed 
differences in the clock skews of computers when booted from a different operating 
system.  
Table 13.   Mean Linear Programming and Linear Regression Clock Skews for 
Host 102 – Dell Latitude E6430 Running Various Operating 
Systems 







10.10.8.31 -8.1262 -8.1360 
10.10.8.32 -8.1252 -8.1582 
10.10.8.33 -8.1231 -8.1275 
Ubuntu 14.04 
10.10.8.34 13.7592 13.6835 
10.10.8.35 13.7600 13.6574 
10.10.8.36 13.7587 13.6665 
freeBSD 12.0 
10.10.8.37 -598920.03 1667652.00 
10.10.8.38 -1985387.07 7238501.11 
10.10.8.39 -519820.73 26827071.88 
Table 14.   Mean Linear Programming and Linear Regression Clock Skews for 
Host 103 – Dell Latitude E6540 Running Various Operating 
Systems 






Linux Mint 18.1 
10.10.8.31 -10.9307 -10.9795 
10.10.8.32 -10.9333 -10.9730 
10.10.8.33 -10.9352 -10.9724 
Ubuntu 12.04 
10.10.8.34 10.3061 10.3024 
10.10.8.35 10.3077 10.3023 
10.10.8.36 10.3061 10.3043 
freeBSD 12.0 
10.10.8.37 -816815.26 -53436558.43 
10.10.8.38 -1878372.71 -22952129.85 
10.10.8.39 -927646.91 7604539.66 
In summary, this chapter focused on multi-homed detection of triple-homed 
devices. A detailed description of triple-homed test bed, testing, and results was 
discussed. The testing and analysis of this chapter further confirmed that the remote 
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multi-homed detection method outlined in Chapter III is feasible if the target clock skews 
are consistent and have a Gaussian shape. When the timestamp offset values of the host 
do not produce a Gaussian shape, the confidence interval detection method proposed is 
not sufficient to identify which IP addresses originated from a given host. This chapter 
also showed that the clock skew from a device depends on the hardware and the 
operating system that is installed. The next chapter summarizes the findings and proposes 
possible future work. 
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VI. CONCLUSION
Multi-homed devices pose a threat to networks protected by firewalls and 
physical separation schemes. The primary motivation for this research was to identify 
hosts that are capable of bypassing firewalls and physical separation security measures by 
employing multi-homed connections. The idea of using clock skews to detect multi-
homed devices was first presented in [5] as the clock skews were shown to be unique and 
remained relatively constant over long periods of time. Continuing this work, we 
validated the detection scheme proposed in [5] and applied it to a larger set of devices 
and operating systems.  
To expand the applicability of the detection scheme, we built an SDN and 
connected 13 multi-homed devices running 11 different operating systems. We 
performed dual-homed testing by passively collecting TCP timestamps and calculating an 
estimated clock skew using linear programming and linear regression methods. The clock 
skews were then used to calculate a mean clock skew and a confidence interval. The 
confidence interval detection was used to determine which IP addresses were multi-
homed.  
For completeness, we tested the detection scheme on triple-homed devices by 
altering the dual-homed test bed to support triple-homed testing and vertical testing. 
Vertical testing was conducted to determine the effects the operating system has on the 
clock skew and subsequent confidence interval based detection. The operating systems 
that were selected represented a wide range of what was available at the time of testing.   
A. SIGNIFICANT RESULTS 
We were able to remotely collect traffic and determine the clock skews for 
devices using both linear programming and linear regression methods. To determine 
computation times for clock skew calculations, we used the built-in tic and toc functions 
in MATLAB. The linear regression method was 2–3 times faster at calculating clock 
skews when compared to linear programming. As long as network delays are minimized, 
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the use of linear regression may prove beneficial, as it was less computationally intensive 
and less complex to implement than linear programming. When clock skews were stable 
and consistent, the results from linear programming and linear regression were consistent 
with one another. 
We were able to identify dual and triple-homed hosts when running various 
operating systems as long as the calculated clock skews from a host were consistent. 
Through vertical testing, we determined that clock skew consistency depends on the 
operating system installed and not on the hardware. Our results showed that a device can 
exhibit consistent clock skews under one operating system and erratic and inconsistent 
clock skews under a different operating system while keeping the hardware configuration 
the same.  
All multi-homed devices were detected with clock skews, with the exception 
being OS X 10.11 El Capitan and freeBSD 12.0. In an older release of OS X 10.6, the 
clock skew was consistent and able to be fingerprinted. This led to the conclusion that 
Apple changed the way timestamp data is handled following the release of Snow Leopard 
in 2009. All attempts to fingerprint freeBSD 12.0 were unsuccessful as the resultant clock 
skews were inconsistent. Ultimately we were able to show that multi-homed detection 
proposed in [5] depends on the operating system installed and the consistency within the 
generation of clock skews.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We tested the proposed detection scheme on an SDN that was on the same subnet 
being controlled from one controller. The methodology used in this research requires the 
user to use a fingerprinter on each subnet installed on a network. The ultimate goal of this 
work would be to move the fingerprinting process to the controller and remove the need 
of using a stand-alone fingerprinting device. Moving the fingerprinting and detection to 
the controller has many benefits, which includes the capability to fingerprint all devices 
on a network regardless of the subnet.  
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The proposed scheme to identify if a host is connected to two physically separated 
networks simultaneously, as depicted in Figure 2, requires the use of two fingerprinters. 
The concern of using different fingerprinters is that the estimated clock skews depend on 
the target device and the fingerprinter. Since the two fingerprinters have independent 
clocks, a method must be determined in order for the results to be directly compared. 
Future effort would be to create a detection scheme that can be used between two 
fingerprinters to detect hosts connected to different networks. 
We were unsuccessful in detecting multi-homed connections when the device was 
running newer versions of OS X and freeBSD 12.0. These two operating systems are 
BSD-based, however, another BSD-based operating system (Snow Leopard) did not 
exhibit these issues. Further investigation into the way in which TCP timestamps are 
generated within these operating systems will prove useful when designing a more robust 
detection scheme. 
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APPENDIX A. MATLAB CODE FOR CALCULATING 
CLOCK SKEW 
The MATLAB code to calculate clock skews (see Section D, Chapter III) is 
contained below. The script imports an excel file that contains the observed times and 
raw timestamp data. From this data, the observed time offset ix  and the timestamp offset 
iw  are used to determine the observed offset iy . The MATLAB function linprog is used 
to calculate linear programming clock skews, and the MATLAB function fit is used to 
calculate linear regression clock skews. The output data is a matrix of estimated clock 
skews for each IP address for one trial. The clock skews are then collected and saved in 
an EXCEL data table for confidence interval calculations. 






% Change default axes fonts to Times New Roman 
set(0,'DefaultAxesFontName', 'Times New Roman') 
set(0,'DefaultAxesFontSize', 12) 
% Change default text fonts to Times New Roman 
set(0,'DefaultTextFontname', 'Times New Roman') 
set(0,'DefaultTextFontSize', 12) 
% Determine the time to execute the calculations 
tic 
%% Load the data from a single test run 
run_name = 'z_Run_072.xlsm'; 
Data = xlsread(run_name); 
% List of the host's last IP address, 10.10.8.* 
hosts = [1,2,3,4,5,6,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,24,25]; 
L = length(hosts); 
%% Calculate the Clock Skew and plot the data 
for n = 1:L 
  % Prints the current calcuation for the host and debugging 
  fprintf('****************** %d ******************\n',hosts(n)); 
  % Checks the entire row for the the hosts IP address 
  [row,~] = find(Data == hosts(n));  
  % Extract data for a given IP address 
  Hosts = Data(row,:);
  % Create a matrix for that data 
  for k = 1:length(Hosts) 
x(k) = Hosts(k,1) - Hosts(1,1);  
% Calculate the time offset relative to the initial point listed 
v(k) = Hosts(k,3) - Hosts(1,3);  
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% Calculate the timestamp offset relative to the initial point listed 
  end 
  b = ones(length(x),1); 
  a = [x' b]; 
  f = [sum(x)/length(x) 1]; 
  I = linprog(f, -a, -v);
  % Solve the linear programing solution for frequency (Hz) 
  for k = 1:length(Hosts) 
w(k) = v(k)/round(I(1));  
% Adjust v based on frequency the difference between observed and 
% actual time 
y(k) = w(k) - x(k);
  end 
  z = linprog(f, -a, -y);
  % Linear programming solution for which reports the slope of O, 
  % which is the clock skew 
  Z(n) = z(1); 
  B(n) = z(2); 
  % plot of the reflines 
  figure 
  hold on 
  plot(x,y,'r.')
  %plotting the upper bound limit of O 
  h = refline(z(1),z(2)); 
  get(h, 'linewidth'); 
  set(h, 'linewidth', 2.5); 
  title(['Clock Skew for host 10.10.8.' num2str(hosts(n)) ' ']) 
  xlabel('Time offset (seconds)','FontName','Times New Roman') 
  ylabel('Timestamp offset (seconds)','FontName','Times New Roman') 
  f = fittype('poly1'); 
  [fit1, gof, fitinfo] = fit(x',10^6*y','poly1'); 
  fit1 
  % clear variables 
  clear Hosts row x v b a f I w y z h 
end 
% Converts Z into ppm 
Z = Z*1000000'; 
B = B'; 
% Output the clock skew values 
format long 
fprintf('Clock Skew \n') 
fprintf('%8.10f\n' ,[Z']') 
%% Compare Clock Skews between hosts 
figure 
axis([0 length(Data) 0 0.02]) 
axis([0 2000 0 0.02]) 
hold on 
%% Compare Clock Skews between hosts – The example shown is only for 1 IP 
address. The remaining code was omitted for brevity. 
C1 = refline(Z(1),B(1)); 
57 
get(C1, 'color'); 
set(C1, 'color', 'm'); 
% Plot all of the clock skews from a given run on single plot 
legend('10.10.8.1 ','10.10.8.2 ','10.10.8.3 ','10.10.8.4 ','10.10.8.5 ',... 
 '10.10.8.6 ','10.10.8.10','10.10.8.11','10.10.8.12','10.10.8.13',... 
 '10.10.8.14','10.10.8.15','10.10.8.16','10.10.8.17','10.10.8.18',... 
 '10.10.8.19','10.10.8.20','10.10.8.21','10.10.8.24','10.10.8.25',... 
 'Location','best');  
title('Comparison of clock skews for all hosts')  
xlabel('Time offset (seconds)','FontName','Times New Roman')  
ylabel('Timestamp offset (seconds)','FontName','Times New Roman') 
fprintf(run_name); 
fprintf('\n'); 
% End timing function 
toc 
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APPENDIX B. MATLAB CODE FOR CALCULATING 
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS 
The MATLAB code to calculate the mean, upper bound, and lower bound of a 
confidence interval for a given IP address (see Section E, Chapter III) is listed below. The 
script imports an excel file that contains all of the estimated clock skews from each trial. 
The MATLAB function paramci is used to calculate the confidence intervals. The output 
data is a matrix of the mean, upper bound, and lower bound for each IP address. The 
histograms and confidence interval graphs, for each IP address, are also produced within 
the code. 
 






% Change default axes fonts. 
set(0,'DefaultAxesFontName', 'Times New Roman') 
set(0,'DefaultAxesFontSize', 12) 
% Change default text fonts. 
set(0,'DefaultTextFontname', 'Times New Roman') 
set(0,'DefaultTextFontSize', 12) 
%% Load the data from trials 
data_name = 'ConfInt_linprog_data.xlsx'; 
data_name = 'ConfInt_regress_data.xlsx'; 
TrialData = xlsread(data_name)'; 
% List of the host's last IP address, 10.10.8.* 
hosts = [1,2,3,4,5,6,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,24,25];  
%% Caclulate the CI – only the first 2 IP address calculations are shown 
here for brevity 
pd1 = fitdist(TrialData(:,1),'Normal'); 
ci1 = paramci(pd1); 
pd2 = fitdist(TrialData(:,2),'Normal'); 




mu = [pd1.mu; pd2.mu; pd3.mu; pd4.mu; pd5.mu; pd6.mu; pd10.mu; pd11.mu;... 
  pd12.mu; pd13.mu; pd14.mu; pd15.mu; pd16.mu; pd17.mu; pd18.mu;... 
  pd19.mu; pd20.mu; pd21.mu; pd24.mu; pd25.mu]; 
e = [pd1.mu-ci1(1,1); pd2.mu-ci2(1,1); pd3.mu-ci3(1,1); pd4.mu-ci4(1,1);... 
  pd5.mu-ci5(1,1); pd6.mu-ci6(1,1); pd10.mu-ci10(1,1); pd11.mu-
ci11(1,1);... 
  pd12.mu-ci12(1,1); pd13.mu-ci13(1,1); pd14.mu-ci14(1,1);... 
  pd15.mu-ci15(1,1); pd16.mu-ci16(1,1); pd17.mu-ci17(1,1);... 
  pd18.mu-ci18(1,1); pd19.mu-ci19(1,1); pd20.mu-ci20(1,1);... 
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set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'' '10.10.8.1' '10.10.8.2' '10.10.8.3' '10.10.8.4'... 
  '10.10.8.5' '10.10.8.6' '10.10.8.10' '10.10.8.11' '10.10.8.12' ... 
  '10.10.8.13' '10.10.8.14' '10.10.8.15' '10.10.8.16' '10.10.8.17' ... 
  '10.10.8.18' '10.10.8.19' '10.10.8.20' '10.10.8.21' '10.10.8.24' ... 
  '10.10.8.25'}); 
set(gca,'XTick',1:20,'XTickLabel','')  
lab=[{'10.10.8.1'}; {'10.10.8.2'}; {'10.10.8.3'}; {'10.10.8.4'}; 
{'10.10.8.5'};... 
  {'10.10.8.6'}; {'10.10.8.10'}; {'10.10.8.11'}; {'10.10.8.12'};... 
  {'10.10.8.13'}; {'10.10.8.14'}; {'10.10.8.15'}; {'10.10.8.16'};... 
  {'10.10.8.17'}; {'10.10.8.18'}; {'10.10.8.19'}; {'10.10.8.20'};... 
  {'10.10.8.21'}; {'10.10.8.24'}; {'10.10.8.25'}]; 
  
hx = get(gca,'XLabel'); 
set(hx,'Units','data');  
pos = get(hx,'Position');  
y = pos(2);  
X=1:20; 
for i = 1:size(lab,1)  





ylabel('Clock Skew (ppm)') 
  
%% Table of all hosts and their confidence interval  
D=[mu+e,mu,mu-e]' 
  
%% Display means of clock skews 
fprintf('Clock Skew Mean\n') 
fprintf('%8.10f\n' ,[mu]') 
  
%% Dual Homed Detection 
for i=1:length(mu) 
  for N=1:length(mu) 
    if mu(i)-e(i)<=mu(N) && mu(i)+e(i)>=mu(N) 
      x(i,N)=1; 
      x(N,N)=0; 
    end 




%% Comparing Clock Skews 
for i=1:length(mu) 
  for N=1:length(mu) 
    Y(i,N)=abs(mu(i)-mu(N)); 
  end 
end 
  




% plot 10.8.8.* – The code for  
figure 
plot(x,mu,'r*') 
set(gca,'XTickLabel',{'' '10.10.8.1' '10.10.8.2' '10.10.8.3' '10.10.8.4'... 
  '10.10.8.5' '10.10.8.6' '10.10.8.10' '10.10.8.11' '10.10.8.12' ... 
  '10.10.8.13' '10.10.8.14' '10.10.8.15' '10.10.8.16' '10.10.8.17' ... 
  '10.10.8.18' '10.10.8.19' '10.10.8.20' '10.10.8.21' '10.10.8.24' ... 
  '10.10.8.25'}); 
set(gca,'XTick',1:20,'XTickLabel','')  
lab=[{'10.10.8.1'}; {'10.10.8.2'}; {'10.10.8.3'}; {'10.10.8.4'}; 
{'10.10.8.5'};... 
  {'10.10.8.6'}; {'10.10.8.10'}; {'10.10.8.11'}; {'10.10.8.12'};... 
  {'10.10.8.13'}; {'10.10.8.14'}; {'10.10.8.15'}; {'10.10.8.16'};... 
  {'10.10.8.17'}; {'10.10.8.18'}; {'10.10.8.19'}; {'10.10.8.20'};... 
  {'10.10.8.21'}; {'10.10.8.24'}; {'10.10.8.25'}]; 
hx = get(gca,'XLabel'); 
set(hx,'Units','data');  
pos = get(hx,'Position');  
y = pos(2);  
X=1:20; 
for i = 1:size(lab,1)  




ylabel('Clock Skew (ppm)') 






  d=TrialData(:,i); 
  figure 
  h=histfit(d,10); 
  xlabel('Clock Skew (ppm)') 
  ylabel('Trials') 
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